Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines,
libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the
dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a)
imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice.
[Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, 31 October 1990, 191
SCRA 61, 67]
In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged
libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Jurisprudence has
laid down a test to determine the defamatory character of words used
in the following manner, viz:
"Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly
made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated
to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person
or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain
offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public
ridicule. . . . " [Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161
SCRA 427 (1988) citing U.S. v. O'Connell, 37 Phil. 767 (1918)]
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person
the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third
person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard
about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person
has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is
the estimate in which others hold him in, not the good opinion which
he has of himself." [Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51
(1995)]
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it
must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to
identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. In the case
of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) the Supreme Court
ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November
30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19
A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, the high court also declared
that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of
the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of
action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have
identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle
vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance,
especially where a group or class of persons, as in the case at bar,
claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the
collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to
prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d.
1384).
PRESUMPTION OF MALICE:
The law also presumes that malice is present in every defamatory
imputation. Thus, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that:
"Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another
in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions."
Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged
communication, the character of which is a matter of defense that
may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the
accused. Once it is established that the article is of a privileged
character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff
who must then convince the court that the offender was prompted by
malice or ill will. When this is accomplished the defense of
privilege becomes unavailing. [Santos v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-45031, 21 October 1991, 203 SCRA 110, 114]
Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is
defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice
on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already
presumes that the defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in
law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good
intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal
inference of malice.
In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if
the ill will is engendered by one's sense of justice or other
legitimate or plausible motive, such feeling negatives actual
malice. [Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, Bk.
II, 1997 Ed., citing People v. de los Reyes, Jr., 47 OG 3569]
It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the
dissemination of the article alleged to be libelous must attend the
distribution itself. It cannot be merely a resentment against a
person, manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or one
displayed at a much later date.
HOW COMMITTED:
Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, libel may be
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means.
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE:
Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or bysimilar means, shall
be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or
pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.
DEFENSES:
In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given
in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged
as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not
constituting
a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been
made
against Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge
of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation
made by
him, he shall be acquitted.
It is important to remember that any of the imputations covered
by Article 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid down
in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true; if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of
the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks
not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person who claims to have been defamed. Truth then is not a defense,
unless it is shown that the matter charged as libelous was made with
good motives and for justifiable ends.